Naval War College Review
Volume 3
Number 8 October

Article 1

1950

October 1950 Full Issue
The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation
Naval War College, The U.S. (1950) "October 1950 Full Issue," Naval War College Review: Vol. 3 : No. 8 ,
Article 1.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss8/1

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval
War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Naval War College: October 1950 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 8, Art. 1

RESTRICTED

INFORMATION SERVICE
. FOR OFFICERS

Issued Monthly By
The Department 9f Correspondence Courses
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

RESTRICTED
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss8/1

2

Naval War College: October 1950 Full Issue

FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief

of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of
professional interest to officers of the naval service.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are

those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy

Department or of the Naval War College.
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THEATRE LOGISTIC PLANNING
A

lecture

delivered

by

Capt. Henry E. Eccles, USN
at

the Naval War College
March 28, 1950

I-INTRODUCTION
An understanding of theater logistic planning is bas�d on
the understanding of:
The nature and structure of Logistics; the art of command;
nature of war.
the
and
These subjects are all so intertwined that there is no ad
vantage in trying to decide which comes first, the hen or the egg.
Furthermore, we are not so· much concerned with the mani
fold details of planning and planning forms as we are with the
major elements, problems and relationships that confront the
theater commander in planning his logistics. So I shall disriiiss: d¢
tails and forms with the statement that planning forms are in a
process of development in all our major military colleges and many
important details of theater logistics are ably discussed in Chapter
VII of "Joint Overseas Operations". Rather than go into detail in
these matters let me take my cue from the 3rd Chapter of the
Second Epistle to the Corinthians where St. Paul says-"Not of the
letter but of the spirit. For the letter killeth but the spirit -giveth
life." Let us therefore try to develop the basic spirit· or philosophy
of theater logistics:
Captain Eccles is Head of the Logistics Department at the Naval
War College.
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II-DEFINITIONS.
First, a definition of Logistics:
"Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the

conduct of military operations.

Logistics pro

vide the means therefor."
This broad and simple definition has the great advantage of
expressing a relationship between the three major elements of war.

Every problem in war contains these three elements in varying
degrees.

Perhaps it will help us to consider them as three inter-

secting rings.

(Illustration No. 1).

Logistics itself can be said to have three basic elements:

The Determination of Requirements; Procurement and
Distribution, and the aspects of Organization, Planning, Execution
and Supervision. These elements and aspects all enter into every
problem in logistics and they blend and overlap in manner and de

gree which varies greatly according to circumstances.

In general, logistic problems fall into the six broad categories

of Personnel, Supply, Maintenance, Medical, Transportation and

Base Development, or simplifying it greatly, Men, Material and
Services.
III-THE UNIFIED COMMAND
Theater Logistic Planning derives directly from the concepts
of Unified Command as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
If we study their directives we see that in effect the Joint Chiefs
have said,

2
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

RESTRICTED
5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 8, Art. 1

RESTRICTED

ILLUSTRATION NO, 1

RESTRICTED
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss8/1

3
6

Naval War College: October 1950 Full Issue

RESTRICTED

"In the future, theaters of war will be organized as
Unified Commands. In so far as practicable each service
will handle its own logistics under broad coordinating
policies established by the Unified Commander. But when
the Unified Commander sees the need for the consolida
tion of logistic activity he will tell us and we will order
it. Furthermore, the Unified Commander by reason of his
authority of review of requirements and recommendations
of priorities and programs, has the power to exercise direct
logistical control almost as he sees fit just so long as he
keeps out of operating detail.."
If we examine the proposed draft of "Joint Action Armed
Forces," Chapter III Section VII "Logistics (Wartime) ," we see
that the conferees who may have been at odds in many other in
stances, agree on the nature and degree of control the theater com
mander may exercise in war. Theater Commanders will have the au
thority to exercise a very high degree of control in that they are
specifically responsible for policy and coordination in distribution,
supply build-up, maintenance, salvage, base development, trans
portation, port operation, medical and dental service and military
government. Thus we have real unification in the theater of war.
IV-THE NATURE OF WAR
A few words on the nature of war as it affects theater
logistic planning. It is a truism to say that the only constant in
war is variation. War is the constant interplay of variables. In
general it is fought in accordance with campaign plans designed to
accomplish specific objectives, the selection of which is the task of
strategy. The campaign plan for the Central Pacific was originally
drafted in late 1943 and given the code name Granite. In its or4
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
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iginal form it contemplated five separate major amphibious opera
tions-Gilberts, Marshalls, Eniwetok, Truk and the Marianas. This
was amended in June 1944 to abandon Truk, and extend the offensive through Palaus, Mindinau, Luzon, and Formosa and Amoy on
the China Coast. While this campaign plan was not- followed pre
cisely, it nevertheless provided the foundation for the logistic sup
port of the actual operations we did undertake.
Campaigns are usually made up of a series of operations
which themselves may be either simple or complex, brief or pro
tracted, depending on the characteristics of the theater of war, the
capabilities of the opposing forces and other variables. All wars
. seem to have one common characteristic, i. e., they consist of long
periods of comparative inactivity interspered with short periods
of violent conflict. However, this period of comparative quiet is
actually the period of logistic build-up. The process may be likened
to the charging and discharge of an electrical condenser.
This is very well illustrated by a graph of cargo and person
nel shipped by the Army to overseas Atlantic areas in the last war.
(Illustration No. 2) Note particularly the expanding scale of activity
and the build-up before each operation.
Looking at this from a purely theoretical point of view we
may analyze the chart somewhat as follows: (Illustration No. 3)
A steady expansion of theater forces engaged in routine operations
such as patrols, reconnaissance and defensive actions, a progressive
build-up of supplies and equipment for a campaign, and special
build-up and measures for specific operations.
Actually, the build-up prior to each operation only partially
supported the operation it was intended for. In the Pacific we
found often that we were financing one operation with the ma
terial and men originally assembled for the previous one, but which
RESTRICTED
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-arrived opportunely enough to be of use in the base development of
the island just captured.
V-THE BASIC THEATER LOGISTIC PLAN

a:

The charts have shown steadily expanding logistic effort.
How do we coordinate this expansion and at the same time pro

vide for the efficient support of our day-to-day operations? Here we
come to the philosophic basis of theater logistic planning and again

I present a purely theoretical concept: A Basic Theater Logistic

Plan-a plan which in actual practice may very well be Paragraph
4 or the Logistic Annex of a conventional campaign plan. This
basic plan is the heart and soul of the day-to-day operations in a
theater of war and it provides the material build-up for the initia
tion of offensive operations.

Let us start in the center of the chart (Illustration No. 4)
and work out. Every basic theater logistic plan is built .on four
fundamental considerations.
First, . the characteristics of the
theater, its geography, topography and hydrography, its relative
distances and its distance from the continental U. S. Next we
have the - forces involved, then the nature of the operations con
templated and finally, the requirements for mutual or inter
theater support.
In the second circle we have six functional elements; Supply,
Maintenance, Medical, Personnel, Transportation and Base Devel�
opment. You may choose any functional elements you wish-those
shown here are merely representative groupings of the major ele
ments which seem to be common to all theatres.

The theatre commander examines each functional element in
the light of the inter-play of variables in the four fundamental con
siderations and reaches certain types of decisions, which are indi-

8
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cated in the outer ring.

The theater commander will decide to ex

ercise direct control of certain' elements.

delegate control to component commanders.

In other cases he will

In some instances he

will consolidate all of certain activities, in other cases he will merely

outline general policies.

A:nd finally in my opinion he wm · be wise

to ignore certain matters, particularly problems which may work

themselyes out if left alone.

The summation of these decisions becomes the basic theater

logistic plan.

If wisely developed this not only establishes the pro

cedures and policies governing the normal logistics of the theater
but it becomes sound standing operating procedure for the develop

ment of the logistics of specific operations.

On 31 October 1945 CINCPOA'S standing operating pro

cedures governing logistic support of theater forces filled 98 pages.

These were condensations and revisions of many times that volume
of directives which were in effect on V-J Day. By proper planning I

think they could have been boiled down to 20 to 30 pages.
VI-DETAILS OF THE BASIC PLAN

With this general background let us discuss some of the as

pects of this plan.
transportation.

First, consider the relation between supply and

In any war of the future, -American forces must

combine great firepower with great mobility.

It may well be that

an increase . in the efficiency and reliability of our transportation

and distribution system will permit us to lower our usual levels of
supply without danger to our combat forces.
increase mobility.

This would, of course,

In any event we must realize that any unnec

essarily high level of supply reduces mobility.

It is very probable that the theater commander will keep a

very close watch on his supplies of ammunition.

This is a very

10
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specialized field and with the increasing use of new types of guided
missiles and rockets, new problems in storage_ and distribution will
undoubtedly arise.
The very fact that an area petroleum officer is a member of

every theater commander's staff indicates that the theater com
mander actually controls the distribution of petroleum throughout
his command. In this connection it is well to remember that when

we operate major Naval task forces overseas, the oil requirements
are so great that any advanced base storage we can build ashore
is merely a. surge tank in the supply pipeline of fast tankers.

When we remember that one B-36 bombardment group will

burn up a million gallons of aviation gasoline on a single mission,

and that our fleet in its operations at Okinawa used twelve million

barrels of oil, the importance of close control of petroleum products

at the theater level should become very clear. This is especially so

since this tremendous bulk must be kept in motion ; it may be
slowed, or speeded up, but there is no way that any considerable part

may be set down to await prospective use. There just never is that

much storage capacity.

Furthermore any undue retention of fast

tankers to build up ready supplies will result in shortages months
later.

VII----TRANSPORTATION
In addition to its effect on levels of supply, the subject of

transportation raises some very interesting points.

From·time to

time the suggestion is made that ocean transportation will be con

trolled wholly from Washington.

While undoubtedly Washington.

must of necessity exercise a very important degree of control in

world shipping, still we must remember that the theater command

ers have the major combat operational responsibility and therefore
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must have commensurate logistical operational authority.

Actually

a compromise will probably be made but it should be based on recog
nition of many considerations.

The subject of transportation falls into two main categories;

operation and traffic management, and an understanding of the na
ture of these is important to all who deal with logistics.

Operation

•concerns itself primarily with the most efficient management of the

carrier, be it ail airplane, a truck or a ship. Traffic management is

concerned with the most efficient distribution of the material which

is being transported.

It is very important that these two aspects of transporta

tion be considered as separate and that their relative importance be

The proper goal of carrier operation is to serve
t
. he demands of traffic management.·
clearly understood.

In considering operation we must bear in mind that oceanic

shipping is world-wide and so cuts across all theaters of war and
that in wartime it involves commercially-manned as well as Navy

manned ships, that it is internationally owned and operated and

.. that it involves so-called strategic shipping and cargoes for the sup

port of allies and neutrals as well as the strictly military or op

. erational cargoes. However, a theater combat commander views his
transportation problem as a whole whereas the transportation op

eration agencies may tend to view their problems from the some

what narrower aspect of a shipping company, an airline or a truck
ing company or railroad.

When a theatre commander has this broad point of view he

may change th� emphasis of his concern from one means of trans
portation to another as varying needs of the combat situation de
mand, and make the necessary adjustments..

12
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If all transportation were to be controlled from Washington,
that responsiveness to immediate or vital local needs would tend to
become sluggish. On the other hand the theater commander must un
derstand the far-reaching effects of "retentions" on the whole ship
ping picture.
We may conclude therefore that the theater commander
must exercise a high degree of control of all transportation, that
the actual carrier operation be delegated, and that the theater com
mander reserve to hims�lf movement control and traffic manage
ment. The control of material flow is. best exercised by allocations
of cargo space to component commanders.

It goes �ithout saying

that the commander himself must understand the nature of the
problem.

In addition he requires the staff assistance of experts in

this important and highly specialized field.
In a very real sense we may think of transportation as the
mortar, or bond, that ties all parts of the theater logistic system
together.
in motion.

All over the theater, men and material are constantly
A bottleneck anywhere inevitably slows down traffic

all along the line, and a sudden closing of any valve may well rup
ture the pipeline.

An enormous amount of energy is lost in the

inertia of starting and stopping the flow, and it should be the
theater commander's objective to keep the flow of traffic as smooth
and continuous as his military operations will permit.
The general term maintenance covers a multitude of prob
lems.

In a theater in .which major naval forces are operating, it

includes ship maintenance, repair and salvage.

Normally of course

such matters are of primary concern to the Navy Component
Commander (Fleet Commander) who handles them through the
type and task force commanders. However, in such cases we fre
quently find that the theater commander is a Naval officer and in
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that case, so far, he has always worn two hats, theater and fleet, in

which case the theater commander is very much concerned with

such problems and his plans so indicate.

VIII-PLANNING FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION
Rather than dwell too long on the basic theater logistic
plan, let us pass to logistic planning for a specific operation. It is in

connection with these specific operations that we encounter two
terms that are frequently misused: "feasibility" and "calculated
risk". In some instal!ces it is considered that the logistics section
of a staff decides the logistic feasibility of a contemplated course

of action. This, of course, is not the case. The logistics section
assists the commander in determining feasibility by making a

logistic estimate or staff study. This estimate is a calculation of
the logistic requirements necessary to support the operation, and
a study of how logistic resources may best be employed to fulfill
these requirements. The summary includes statements of pros
pective deficiencies, with estimates as to how these deficiencies may
limit the freedom of action of the commander and recommendations

as to what can or should be done to overcome or compensate for

the prospective deficiencies. The commander then decides the logistic

feasibility of his course of action and he decides the risk involved,

balancing this calculated risk against the gains to be achieved. · I

know of no finer discussion of the calculated risk than that con

tained on page 34 of Fleet Admiral King's, "US Navy �t War
1941-1945.". Calculating risk is an exacting exercise of profess

ional judgment and the term should not be used loosely as a
blanket to cover the corpse of sloppy thinking.

Planning for an operation has the same general character

istics as basic planning in that it derives from, and must be cons.

14
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current with, strategic planning, and it is governed by the same
basic considerations, and results in similar types of decisions. · But
in ope;ational planning, most logistic tasks are delegated to task
force commanders with the component and type commanders acting
in support. However, the need for keeping the enemy off balance
requires that offensive operations be launched as rapidly as logistic
considerations permit. Since task force planning staffs cannot be
rapidly asssembled and then quickly start to plan effectively, it
is necessary. for th� theater commander to prepare many of the
plans that in theory .should be made by the task force commander.
There simply is no other staff which can do this work in time to
meet target dates.
The most practicable means of "beating" the vital factor of
lead time is by submitting long range forecasts. In World War II
CINCPOA issued staff studies and general planning directives
months in advance of his operational directives and this enabled -his
component and type commanders to calculate and submit material .
and personnel forecasts. This combination of staff study and pla�
ning directive also permitted concurrent strategic and logistic plan
ning at the operational level. Furthermore, even if the targets aiid
dates were shifted, the logistic support built up by the forecasts
usually fitted the new operation very well;
We should never forget the fact that operational logistics
actually acquire great and real physical momentum. Thousands
of tons of solid material are actually moving. While tinder favorable
conditions we can change the direction of the mass or somewhat
modify its composition, there are other conditions where all the
orders in the world have no effect. Recognition of lead time, fore
casting, decentralization of execution, etc., all contribute to the
flexibility we desire. Nevertheless we must understand that a
reasonably good plan that is understood and is feasible of accom-
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plishment is far superior to the "perfect plan" which is difficult to
understand and issued too late. So there always comes a time when
we must· say "This is

changes!"

I recommend

to
'

it-Let

well· enough

alone-No more

all of you the study of the' plans for the

· Olympic Operation, the invasion of Kyushu.

For while there was in

that operation a dangerous lack of clarity in command relations,
the plans reflected very valuable experience in logistic planning.
IX-GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Let me offer some thoughts as to certain principles which ap

ply to logistic planning at theater level.
as to the use of the word "principles".

But first a word of caution

Since we are only just be

ginning to develop logistic theory and principle we should not use

the word in its strictest sense but rather in a very broad sense as a

statement of something that we believe to be generally true.

First: The combat commander must have control of his own

logistic support.

The corollary to this is that he must be competent to and

prepared to exercise this control in harmony with the overall war

effort-that is to say, in accordance with the principles of mutual

support and unity of effort.

A further corollary is that he must

have a staff which is educated and organized to assist him to ex

ercise this authority. To illustrate the growth of such a staff let us
note the growth of the logistic section of Cincpoa's staff from Sep
tember 1943 to July 1945: (Illustration No. 5)

Second: As long as the supply of an itein or a "service" ex

ceeds the requirement for that item or servi�e, strict control is not

16
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necessary.

When, however, a shortage exists, then theater control

is called for.

I suggest three corollaries to this:
(a) The fewer the matters in which the theater com

mander finds it necessary to exercise his power of con

trol the better the logistic system and situation in: that
theater.

(b) A major task of the theatre logistics officer is to

look· ahead and anticipate shortages and the consequent
need for controls, before they occur.

(c) Any system of control of short items must be based

on allocations in order to be effective.

Priorities, except as

part of allocations, are ineffective and self-defeating.
Third:

The more detail that is put into any plan or order,

the shorter the period of time during which that plan can usefully

serve and the fewer the number of organizations that can be ef
fectively controlled.
Fourth:

The higher the authority promulgating on order,

the greater the time and effort required to milke a necessary change,

and the more serious the consequences of a mistake or error in
judgment.
Fifth:

Power and authority attract power and authority ··

.-They are magnetic.

When the Unification Act of 1947 was first framed this

tendency was clearly recognized.

The Staff of the Joint Chiefs

was limited to one hundred and the Secretary of Defense was pro

hibited from having a military staff.

18
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permitted a staff of two hundred and ten and the civilian employees
of the Secretary of Defense have increased greatly. Furthermore,
it would appear that many officers who are carried on the personnel
allowance lists of the military departments are actually spending
much of their time performing duty with other offices within the
Department of Defense.

I mention these matters 1 because I fear the magnetic effect

of power in that it will create a tendency in the Department of De
fense to encroach upon the prerogatives and functions of theater

commanders, and create principalities within the kingdom of the
commander.

X-EVALUATION OF LOGISTIC PLANS
Many of you will leave here to. assume major planning res
ponsibilities. I, therefore, suggest certain criteria which may be
useful in evaluating the logistic plans you may encounter.
But first a caution: We should always remember that any
particular logistic plan can be analyzed only on the basis of a full

knowledge of the strategic concepts and plans it is designed to sup
port and · of the background of the command organization in the
command itself. It is vital that all strategic and logistic planning
be in fact concurrent, and all strategic plans be kept within the.
limitations of our logistic capabilities.
When you are sure of these fundamentals you may then ask:
Are the theater command and the theater staff
structures both designed for war?
Is the theater Jtaff truly a joint staff?
Are the plans up to date?
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Do the plans provide for the · expansion and provision of

logistic resources and services prior to the expansion of
combat elements?

Are the plans within the limitations of our mobilization
capabilities?

Do the plans provide a maximum degree of central policy

control with decentralized execution and operation?

Are the responsibilities of the component and type com

manders clearly defined?

Do the plans place reliance on standing operating pro
cedures?

Are there . provisions for reporting and redistributing

excess stocks?

Do they provide for ready cross-servicing and use-of com

mon facilities?

Are there provisions for inter-theater mutual support?
If these questions can be answered yes, the chances are

that the plans and organizations will function well in war.

cases, however, beware of a superficial analysis.

In all

XI-CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me leave you with these thoughts; Theater

strategic and logistic planning are inseparable.

In addition to

growing concurrently with the strategic plans, the logistic plans "
are intimately related to the command organization.

A sound

theater staff organization is essential to the formulation of good
logistic plans and to their smooth execution.

20
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Theater logistic planning consists of two main parts: First,

the Basic Theater Logjstic Plan (Paragraph 4 or the logistic an
nex of a conventional Campaign Plan), and second, developing from
this, the Logistic Plan for a Specific Operation (Para 4 or the
Logistics Annex of the Operation Plan).

While good planning forms, factors and usage data are es

sential tools, they themselves do not constitute nor produce good
plans. Good plans are the product of the skilled professional

judgment of the planner.

And finally-Don't expect the plan you draw up in peace

time to be the plan you necessarily use in war.

Any peacetime

plan, when you do not have or exercise the initiative, is merely
the foundation and mental preparation for what you must do in
war.

And that mental preparation is more important than the

plan itself.

For only when the planning process, its major con

siderations, and the various relations of cause and effect are clear

ly understood, can our commanders make the rapid readjustments
that are required when the early course of the war follows the
enemy's plan rather than our plan.
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THEIR APPLICATION
TO STRATEGY AND TACTICS
A lecture delivered by

Captain G. K. Carmichael, USN
at the Naval War College.
August 17, 1950
The task of the Naval War College mission is to further an

understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, with. emphasis on
their application to future naval warfare. Accordingly, it is

my purpose this morning to examine some of the fundamental truths
of war and to indicate how these so-called principles of war are ap
plicable to strategy and tactics.

Although exact definitions of the fields of war-strategy, tac

tics, and logistics-are difficult to arrive at, and may create futile

discussion as to semantic distinctions, some definitions are desirable
as a basis for study and discussion.

The dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for joint usage, issued·

by the .Joint Chiefs of Staff, defines strategy and tactics as follows:

Strategy is defined as : "The art and science of developing and

using the political, economic, psychological, and armed forces of a

nation, during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support

to national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favor�

able consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."

scope.

It may be noted that this definition of strategy is broad in
It includes not only the military aspects, but also the politi

cal, economic, and psychological aspects of a nation's conduct, during

Captain Carmichael is a member of the staff of the Naval War College.
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both peace and war.

It has as its. purpose not only the winning· of

war, but also of winning the peace by increasing the favorable con

sequences of victory. In this sense the term is often referred to as
"national strategy", or "grand strategy".

Whfn the term strategy

is restricted to the employment of armed forces it is someti:rµes

spoken of as "military strategy", and it is in this sense that I shall
use the term strategy in this discussion.

Tactics is defined as: One, "The employment of units in com
bat", and two, "The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in
relation to each other and/or to the enemy."
Recent developments in the scientific field, such as radar, long
range rockets, and guided missiles make it difficult to determine
just when forces may be said to be in contact with the enemy; or

even in combat, and, it becomes diffi�ult to differentiate be

tween strategy and tactics, And, although it may be impossible to

say at just what point the field of strategy, of tactics, or of logis
tics leaves off and another of these fields begins, there are certain
fundamental principles which govern in all three of these fields of
warfare. These are the principles of war-principles which may be

applied to arrive at strategic, tactical or logistical concepts of war.

It has been said that the only thing constant in war is change
itself. Throughout history, new inventions have dictated changes in
strategy, tactics, and logistics. As for naval tactics, we can observe,
for example, how the cannon changed the tactics of ramming and

boarding to one of maneuver.and fire concentration out to the maxi
mum gun range, or how Naval Air has changed the Battle Line con

cept of capping the "T" of the enemy line to the Carrier Task Force

concept of striking a crippling blow against the enemy fleet at the
extreme range of the attack plane.
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Let us consider for a moment the ten chief t�ctical principles
ated
by Lord Nelson ,and employed by him with such suc
ul
rm
fo
cess. They are:
1. The principle objective is the complete annihilation of the
enemy's fleet: partial victory is not enough.
2. Concentration of own masses against enemy fractions.
3. A close and decisive action is necessary.
4. Units must support each other and keep close to the enemy.
5. It is necessary for subordinates to know the plans of the com
mander-in-chief, whose principal business is to bring the en
emy to action on the most, advantageous terms.

6. The division of large fleets into squadrons whose commanders , ··
have full discretion.
7. Consideration of the moral qualities of an adversary is an
essential factor.
8. The order of sailing is the order of battle, and the less man
euvering the better.
9. "Time is everything", and simplicity of method is desirable.
10. Victory must be followed up.
The basis of these tactical doctrines is the principles of war
-the principle of the objective, of mass, of the offensive, of man·. euver, of simplicity. However new weapons have dictated changes
in these tactical concepts. No longer is close action necessary to
destroy the enemy, and no longer is the "order of sailing the order
of battle". Thus, it may be seen that, while tactics are fluid and
ever changing, certain fundamental truths or principles .of war are
constant. It is the application of these principles which is.variable,
and not the principles themselves.
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Often strategic and tactical changes have been slow in fol

lowing the development of new weapons. To those nations who have

first shown an appreciation of the strategic and tactical signifi�ance

of. new weapons, there has accrued a distinct, and sometimes, a de
eisive, advantage.

For example, it was many years before the

armies of the world appreciated the tactical significance of the

maneuverability of fire power in the tank, motorized artillery and

infantry, as embodied in the German Panzer Division. Yet, the de-

. cisive role that th� Panzer Division played against the static de
fenses of the Maginot ljne is without question.

Today, :with unparalleled advances in new weapons, it is

essential that we develop new strategic and tactical concepts in or

der to realize the. maximum effectiveness .from the tools available.

Similarly, intelligence as to the developments and techniques of our
possible enemies takes on an added significance.

We must answer such questions as these.

How, and under

Is it to be

what circumstances, should we employ the atom bomb?

used primarily in a strategic or a tactical sense?

enemy use the bomb?

How may the

What active and what passive defense

measures should we employ against the A bomb threat?

From a

positions for cruising, for battle, for amphibious assault?

And the

Naval tactical viewpoint, what changes must we make in our dis

same type of study must be given to the implications of the many

. other new developments-the jet plane, the rocket, the guided
missile, and the true submersible.

In early 1939 the old battleships

New York and Texas were

given what is now called radar equipment for full sca1e test afloat.

It was
.

then a secret weapon in the development
test stage.
· The
.
.

implications of this new weapon were enormous.
ported on along these lines:

It

It

was re-

is the greatest invention since the
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advent of radio; it wilf revolutionize naval gunnery and tactics. It
was recommended that an immediate procurement program should

be initiated to equip at the earliest possible time all battleships,
carriers, and cruisers. As we review that report today, it was
prophetic. And, yet, someone a1ong the line was slow in appreciating
the urgency and soundness of those recommendations and decided

to con tract for only_ six (6) equipments to be installed in cruisers
for further test and evaluation. Thus, a year or so, was largely

lost, iilf period of an impending crisis, during which we could have
equipped a major portion of our fleet with radar, developed our
technique, and trained our personnel in its employment and main
tenance.

I cite thi.s example for two reasons; first to emphasize the

enormous importance of adjusting

quickly our tactical concepts to·

new weapons; and secondly, to indicate that there are times when a
new weapon should be expoited when it is a serviceable one-with"

out waiting for the technical people and the scientists to produce
what they consider to be a perfect, or near perfect, instrument. There
are other times, however, when new weapons should not be employed

until they are available in quantity. This will be indicated in later
discussion.

It is possible to find many instances of the technical bureaus' ·
keeping a weapon in the test stages long after it was serviceable,
searching for this or that answer-which might well have come
sooner if it had been put into service and given operational field
tests. We might now do more toward getting the bugs out of some
of our guided missiles, for example, and, certainly we could do more
toward developing strategic and tactical concepts as how best to
employ them if they were put into production now and gotten out to
the operating forces. Time may be running out. And it takes time
to develop techniques and train in the employment, servicing, and
maintenance of new weapons.
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Korea should prove an excellent testing ground for new

weapons and new strategic and tactical

weapons.

concepts

based on such

To so make it, a deliberate and studied program should

be initiated.

The opportunity we have there is analogous to that

which Germany utilized so effectively in Spain prior to World
War II.

Our tactical concepts today are largely those of World War

II and need close examination and study to adapt them to the ne"".
weapons being developed.

It is a real

c hallenge

to

c ondition

our

minds, not to World War II but to World War III concepts. It is not

enough in solving military problems to dive into USF2 or USF4 or
FMlOl-10 and come up with an answer.

Use them, yes; but, by all

means, try to devise something better than cruising disposition 4C

or battle disposition 4M-something which

considers

the new

weapons we have, and those which the enemy is likely to have.
Now what to use as a basis for these new

c oncepts?

The

Principles of War. They are based on all of military history and

have stood the test of some revolutonary weapon developments

and radical concepts of how to employ weapons.

Before presenting them, a few words of .caution

their application are in order.

concerning

They should not be considered as if

they were religious tenets, but rather as guides in planning and ex

ecuting military operations. The correct application of any one, or

several of them, will not assure success, particularly when, at the
same time, another of the principles is violated.

In fact, the correct

application of all of the principles may not assure success providing

the morale forces are lacking.
cipline,

The human elements-morale, dis

leadership-are so vital to success that they deserve our

first and uninterrupted attention.

You will recall that according to

Napoleon "Moral force is to the physical as three to one."
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is always present the danger of becoming so engros&ed in the theory,
art, or science of war (whatever you choose to call it) that the
human factors are lost sight of, the initiative restricted, or the
imagination dam�ened. There is also the danger of making the as
sumption that these principles are all inclusive and offer a magic
formula to resolve any military problem. A military commander
must resolve for himself what the principles of war imply, and how
they should be applied.
']Clausewitz, a century ago, included the "gaining of public
opinion", as one of the three fundamental objectives in war. It is
probably just as important today-if not more so-than it was 100
years ago, but to my knowledge it is not included in any present
day listings of the principles of war. Nevertheless, one should exer
cise in the application of the fundamentals of war in studying mili
tary history and in the solution of military problems, until their
use becomes second nature. In the heat of battle, application of
these principles should be subsconscfous, not self-conscious.
Currently the Army Command and Staff School lists nine
principles of war of the United States Army. The principles are:

1.

The Objective.

2.

The Offensive.

3. Mass.
4.

Maneuver.

5. Surprise.
6. Security.

7. Economy of Forces;
8.

Unity of Command.

9. _ Simplicity.
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Although you will not find the principles of war listed in

any of the USF publications, as such, you will find the funda
mental truths embodied in these principles in the doctrine and
instructions contained in the Fleet Publications.

The War Manual of the Royal Navy lists a total of ten prin

ciples of war, which are, for the most part; identical to those taught

in the U. S. Army.

They do not, however, include Simplicity;

instead they list Maintenance of Morale and Administration.

Using the Command and Staff School list I shall make a few
comments on each of the principles, with particular emphasis on
their application to naval strategy and tactics.

OBJECTIVE
If any of the principles may be said to be more important

than the others, that one is the principle of the objective.

certainly fundamental, for it defines . the. mission or the aim.

It is

From the national strategic level it defines our national ob
jective or aim. In war it implies the imposition of our nation's
will upon that of the enemy. From the level of high military
strategy it implies the imposition of our will by destruction of his
will to resist, and normally, but not necessarily, entails the des
truction of a large portion of his armed forces.

At every level of command the proper selection of the ob

jective is of the greatest importance.

Properly, it should be one

which supports the objective or mission of the next higher level.

An excellent example of maintenance of the objective, (and

I might say here that the British call this principle "Selection and
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Maintenance of the Aim" rather than simply the Objective) is

Admiral Spruance's action in defending the landing operations in
the Marianas against naval air and naval surface attack instead of
rushing out to meet the oncoming Japanese Fleet.

The primary

mission was an offensive one-the seizure of the Marianas. That
mission could be best accomplished by isolating the objective area

Admir.al
and defending against any incursion by the enemy.
Spruance, keeping in mind the primary mission, took a course of
actio1½ which. would most nearly assure that mission being ac
complished.

Generally, in a naval engagement the tactical objective may

be con�idered to be that part of the enemy's sea-air forces which
has been selected for destruction or neutralization. By. tactical

maneuvers one's major forces should be brought to bear on that

part of the enemy's which it is important to overwhelm, the Bat

tle of Midway is a · splendid example of a proper selection of the

physical objective.

Although the Japanese troop ships were

tempting targets, the carriers were the main threat and were
therefore chosen as the primary objective.

OFFENSIVE
This principle stems from an aggressive state of mind or a

will to destroy the enemy.

It

is characterized by a desire on the

part of the Commander and his subordinates to get at the enemy

and to destroy him.

Nelson embodied that spirit in his tactics of

closing the enemy and annihilating him.

It

entails an assumption

of the initiative and of denying the initiative to the enemy.

The principle of the offensive does not imply that the de

fensive should be ignored.

Clausewit� contends that the defense

is · "the stronger form of warfare" and that therefore a weaker foe
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has a fair chance of assisting a more powerful one.

Passive de

fense measures, such as assuming tactical dispositions best suited
to defend against threatening att�ck, are essential to avoid des
truction.

But the defensive measures should be employed so as to

permit the seizing of any opportunity to take the initiative and
to counter-attack with all the violence at one's command.

The de

fensive must always be assumed in the spirit of the offensive.

It

inay, for example, be assumed merely as a time device to gain time
to mass the necessary forces at the proper place and at the prop

er moment to commence the attack.

The offensive does not imply headlong attack.

It seeks to

bring a vigorous and timely concentration of forces against a weak
er concentration.

A splendid example of the application of the

principle of the offensive was had in the action of the Allies in
landing in North Africa in 1942, on which occasion the initiative

passed to us and our allies and remained with us for the remainder

of the war.

If the assumption of the offensive is going to comprise the

chances of carrying out a mission, it may be necessary to assume
the tactical defensive. For example,. the mission of an Escort Com

mander of getting a convoy through might well require him to
maintain a strong defensive formation and position and thus

restrict his initiative in closing and attacking a threatening :force.

Care must be exercised in assuming the offensive that one's

own force is not over-extended or dissipated to the point that an
enemy counter-attack will be successful.

The principle of the of

fensive implies a well-timed, well-coordinated attack at a decisive
point.

But it implies more than that.

It implies an attack within

the capabilities of the forces making the attack, in order that

it may be sustained and followed up.
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is of such importance that some military students include in the
principles of war the principle of pursuit. The success with which
the German air force pursued the break-through in the low
countries and in France in the last war and with which Montgom
ery's "Desert Rats" pursued Rommel· certainly indicate that pur
suit is a vitally important aspect of the Offensive if not deserving
of a classification as a separate Principle of War.

MASS
This principle goes by many names-superiority, concen

tration, force, and power. It does not necessarily imply an over-all
superiority in numbers. It does imply a superiority of fighting

power at a decisive point.

To enumerate all the factors of fighting power would be an

insurmountable task, but some of the main factors, as far as naval

power is concerned, are fire power and fire concentration includ

ing air power, ability to withstand punishment, maneuverability,
and, of course, the human factors, such as morale and leadership.

And, although a superiority may be enjoyed in several of the fac

tors, it may not be enough if one or more of the others is lacking.

For example, in spite of the enormous material superiority which

the Japanese enjoyed at the Battle off Samar, the poor leadership

of the Japanese Forces deprived them of an impressive tactical vic-:

tory, if not a strategic one.

MANEUVER
Movement is the means by which plans are placed into effect.

Maneuver, then, may be said to be the catalytic agent which fuses

together the other principles. By mobility, forces may accomplish
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mass or surprise.

It gives to the Commander flexibility and free

dom of action which he might not otherwise enjoy.

Movement does not necessarily imply rapidity, although

speed is frequently a vital factor in war.

Movement is a relative

matter, particularly in a tactical sense.. Certainly, the imp<>rtance

of thinking of movement in terms of relative movement or relative
motion need not be emphasized to officers of your experience. And,

the importance of rapid, secure, and reliable communications in

taking full advantage of the principle of movement is obvious.

Three of Jomini's four fundamental principles of strategy

are just as fundamental to naval tactics, and emphasize the enor
mous part that movement plays in the art of war:
"1.

Maneuvering

in such a manner as to engage one's major

forces against parts only of those of the enemy.

"2. In battle, by tactical

maneuvers,

bringing one's major

forces to bear on the decisive area of the battlefield or on

that part of the enemy's lines which it is important to

overwhelm.

"3. Arranging matters in such fashion that these masses of

brought to bear at the decisive place but
put into action speedily and together, so that·

men be not only
that they be

they may make a simultaneous effort."
In each of . these principles,

key to their successful application.

maneuver

and

mobility

is · the

And it is this principle of movement or mobility which gives

such strength to carrier air power,

The ability to move carriers

quickly from the South Pacific to meet the Japanese threat at Mid

way permitted our,Navyto strike a blow at the Japanese Forces of
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such consequences as to change the balance of nav1;1.l power in the
Pa cific and to change the complexion of the war from the strategic.

defensive to the strategic offensive. And while air power is in a
tactical sense highly mobile, it is not so in ·a strategic sense, unless ··

the enormous air base installations and logistic requirements are
available where required, or unless it is carrier borne. It is then,
from this principle of movement or mobility that naval air power
draws its great strength.

SURPRISE
Surprise may be · said to be a two-bladed weapon.

On the

one edge it is capable of inflicting great initial damage on the enetny;

on the other of affecting adversely enemy morale, sometimes to the

point of throwing· him .into complete confusion and thus making

possible his destruction before he is able to regain his balance.

Many_ things are conducive to effecting surprise--secrecy,

deception, careful planning, faultless and rapid execution.

Most

important and often the most difficult to attain is secrecy, particu

larly today with the great emphasis which is being placed on In

telligence and with the many means available to collect in
telligence.

And yet, it appears that it is still possible to effect

surprise---at least initially on a grand scale, for there is little evi

dence available to refute that the invasion of south Korea came as a
complete tactical surprise, if not as a strategic one.

This principle ma,y be applied in the nature of surprise as

time, place, force, technique, direction, and weapons employed.

to

An excellent example of naval tactical surprise as to time is

in the Battle of Savo Island, where the Japanese cruiser force
arrived on the scene much ahead of the time that it was expected

they might, if indeed they were expected at all, with the result
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that four Allied cruisers were destroyed in almost as many minutes,

before any effective fire could be returned on the Japanese
attacking force.

There are many examples where new weapons have come

as complete

tactical

surprise-tanks,

influence fuses, atomic bombs.

gas,

magnetic

mines,

Seldom, if ever, have they been

decisive in determining the outcome of the war, ev�m though it
appears that the new weapons, in some instances, might have been

capable of so doing had they been fully exploited by the power
which first had those weapons.

The difficulty arises from the

failure to employ them in mass, and from the failure to withhold

them until such time as they can be so employed on a continuing
basis.

If surprise is to be most effective, it must be employed in

conjunction with the other principles of war, particularly mass.

New weapons often present contradictions which affect materially

how and when they should be employed.

The longer they are

withheld, the greater the chance that the enemy will learn of

them, especially when they are placed in mass production and
when large numbers of personnel are engaged in training in their

employment. Furthermore, it is a gamble to divert a large portion

of one's war potential to the production and to training in the
employment

of

a

new

weapon

not

battletested.

It would

appear that in World War I, the British might have been able
to change the whole course of the war had they withheld the

tank until it was available to the Allies for use in large

numbers; or, in World War II, that the Germans might have been
able to bring England to terms had they not employed the

magnetic mine until they were able to do so in such mass as to

tie up all shipping seeking ingress or egress to the British Isles.
Instead, both of these new and revolutionary developments in

warfare were employed initially on a small scale and Before they
could be used in mass. Thus, the opponents succeeded in developing a
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countermeasure or a defense against them, as has always been true
when a new weapon is employed.
As for the atomic bomb or the H-bomb, weapons of mass
destruction, they can hardly be classed now as weapons of strategic
surprise by virtue of being new weapons. However, they may be
used as weapons of tactical surprise, both by us and the enemy, as
to time, place, and technique of their employment. It, therefore,
behooves us to give serious study to the offensive and defensive
tactical implications of this new weapon. Having lost its effect
iveness as a new weapon of strategic surprise, might it not be em
ployed to advantage tactically as well as strategically?
Before leaving this principle, I should like to point out that
one of the inherent strengths of sea-air power is its ability to
achieve surprise, both strategically and tactically. Mobility and
weather are two factors which greatly contribute to this ability.
Some may contend that as a result of new developments
such as long range all-weather search planes, equipped with
A. E.W., it is no longer possible.for Carrier Task Forces to.achieve
surprise. On that I should like to make these observations. The
achieving of tactical surprises will be more difficult. However, if
developments in carriers and ·carrier-based all-weather long range
attack planes and A. E. W. planes are permitted to go ahead, the
achieving of tactical surprise should stiU be possible. As for
strategic surprise, the comparative strategic mobility of carrier
based air forces, as opposed to that of great land-based air forces,
will still make it possible for carrier air power to achieve strategic
surprise. It is significant that Germany was not able to move any
appreciable amount of air power to resist the movement of the
Allies onto the beaches of Normandy.
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SECURITY
Security includes all measures to deny to the enemy the
means of gaining intelligence or of inflicting damage on own forces.
It also embraces means to obtain information about the enemy in
order to institute better security measures, such as protecting own
lines of communications.
It implies a defensive attitude, but there are occasions when
the offensive must be assumed to gain the necessary security for
own forces.

For example, the offensive was assumed in our land

ings at Guadalcanal in order to obtain security for our lines of com
munication to Australia while we were still on the strategic de
fensive.
Among the passive measures which may be essential to se
curity from a naval viewpoint are: radio silence, combat air
patrols, electronic countermeasures, air searches, ASW patrols,
radar pickets, zigzags, radio and radar intercept watches.

These

and many others may be employed to avoid the enemy's taking one's
forces by surprise and to better enable one's own forces to be pre
pared to resist attack and to counterattack effectively.
Before leaving. this principle of security, there is another
aspect thereof which is today more significant than at any time in
history since the Trojan horse; that is, security on the home front,
security against the fifth column, and security against subversion
and sabotage.

These may be the most powerful weapons in the

enemy's arsenal, unless we are forever on guard and take the of
fensive against them whenever and wherever the occasion demands.
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ECONOMY OF FORCE
Economy of Force implies a proper proportionment of avail

able forces both in regard to space and time.

It aims at effecting

mass at the decisive place at the proper time.

To do so may

necessitate a reduction of forces at other points to those required

to maintain the bare minimum of security. It, thus, entails a com
promise between concentration and dispersion. It should aim to ef
fect the desired concentration of own forces while, at the same time,

causing the enemy to disperse his forces.

Although economy of force does not imply, in a tactical

sense, cutting down all along the line to bare essentials, it does im

ply that in the strategic sense. For, as the scope of wars seems ever
to increase and the limit of the nation's natural resources to de

crease, it becomes more and more urgent that we weigh contin

ually· the gain against the cost and strive to proportion properly

our sources of national strength, such as manpower, critical ma
terials and industrial capacity.

Both, strategically and tactically,

the selection of proper weapons to be employed is of vital importance
in application of the principle.

Economy of force, like that of surprise, again brings out in

herent strength in sea-air power. The strength is derived, in the ap

plication of this principle, from the ability of sea-air forces to con

centrate great striking power at any one of many points about an

enemy's defensive perimeter, thus making him disperse to meet this
ever present threat. During the past war in the Pacific, the Fast

Carrier Task FoI'ces were employed on the strategic offensive (and it

should be noted that Admiral Nimitz and the Joint Chiefs opposed

any operations ':'7hich would; for an extended period, tie these forces
down to a defensive role) fThus employed, they were able not only to

inflict great material dama�e on the Japanese forces;, but, probably·
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more important, they were able �o require a wide dispersion of

enemy forces, especially air forces, and to make possible the isola
tion of any objective.

And, in spite of some contentions to the contrary that never

again will major amphibious forces be employed, circumstances and
economy of force may dictate that such a course of action is best.

In the last war with Allied troops concentrated in the Brit

ish Isles and the necessary air and naval forces available to project
them against the continent of Europe, Germany was forced to
disperse her defenses from Norway -to the southern coast of

France. Thus, both sea-air and amphibious forces permit own forces
to be concentrated, while, at the same time, requiring the en'emy
to disperse his forces.

UNITY OF COMMAND
Unity of Command implies cooperation. In fact, until recent

ly, the Army Command and Staff School called this principle the

Principle of Cooperation.

The British still do.

With the · advent of the Western Union and the Atlantic

Pact, this principle takes on a significance far greater than ever

before, for it aims at unified action, not only among armed forces

of our nation, but among all the nations with a common aim.,

It has,

as its root, a spirit of unselfishness, a feeling of confidence in leader

ship, and a desire to do, .within the limits of capabilities, what is
necessary to accomplish the objecUve without seeking for one's self,

one's ship, one's service, one's nation, any glory except that which
may accrue, in the course of eve,nts, from doing that which needs

to be done for a common cause.
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It is a principle to which we must constantly direct our at

tention. The cooperation which characterized the relations between

the United States, Britain, and the British Commonwealth Nations
during the past war was excellent.

The problem of attaining a

similar degree of cooperation and unity of command among the

twelve (12) North Atlantic Pact Nations is one of the greatest
magnitude.

1-'here is an ever growing feeling among the Atlantic Pact

Nations that Unity of Command must be effected if that Pact is

going to succeed in accomplishing its objective.

That feeling has

been expressed in recent speeches of such leaders as Mr. Churchill
and Mr. Spaak.

Cooperation, fortunately, is something which can be learned

and nurtured in our daily contacts. It is a spirit which must be de
veloped before the heat of action.

And it must be developed to

such a degree among our Allies that Unity of Command will be at
tained.

SIMPLICITY
Simplicity is a principle which may be applied to many factors

in war-among others, organization, planning, order writing, man

euver, weapon and equipment design.

It makes for order and

tends to eliminate the well known process of order-eounter
order-disorder.

Many of you will recall how our fleet maneuvers, during a

period between the two world wars, became more and more com
plicated, year by year, until we got to the point that the captain of

a capital ship needed one of two signal officers, a tactical officer and

a couple of plotters to assist and advise him in formation maneuvers,
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. and how the three or. four signal halyards were �ept, almost_ con
stantly chock-a-block with bunting.

I recall how one of our Ad

mirals used to deplore, with great rage, that tendency, and point
out that, during his tour of duty as a destroyer skipper in the

Irish Sea during World War I, the only special flags or pennants

that he ever saw were Corpen, Turn and Speed. , He said that we

must simplify our maneuvers if we ever got into action.

Our Fleet

did not appreciate that fact until we did get into a shooting war,
when it became necessary that we revise our tactical concepts; or at
least our techniques of maneuvering.

However, in the field of 'am

phibious warfare, there still remains much to be done to simplify

those inherently complicated operations.

Simplicity in order writing has many virtues.

It reduces·.

the verbiage, it reduces the load of communications, it adds to se

curity, and probably most important of all, it may give the sub

ordinate some freedom of action and permit him to use his in

itiative. One of the keys to this is to tell WHAT is to be done and
avoid telling the subordinate HOW it is to be done.

In conclusion, strategy and tactics, like war itself, are ever

changing and depend on weapons.

As new weapons become avail

able,. new strategic and tactical concepts for their emplQyment
must be evolved, and evolved quickly.

The best guides we have

available in developing these new co)?.cepts, in the absence of a

shooting war, during which they should and can be evolved and
tested, are the Principles of War-objective, offensive, mass, man,

euver, surprise, security, economy of force, unity of command, an_d
simplicity. While it may seem at times that these principles are
contradictory they are in fact complementary, the application of any

one or several of them may not assure success.
blending of them all is essential.

The necessary

But even more essential are the

human factors of morale, discipline, and leadership.
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RECOMMENDED READING
This section lists material published in current periodicals
which will be of interest and value to officers of the Navy, Marine
Corps, and Co�st Guard.
"Korean Attack Opens New Chapter in History."

By John Foster Dulles. Department of State Bulletin.
August 7.

"How Strong Is the Red Air Force?"

By Albert Douglas. The Reporter. August 29.

"The Communists in America."

By Robert H. Jackson. Harper's. September.

"Get

Guerrilla,.Wise/'

By Major Robert B. Rigg. United States Army Combat
- Forces Journal. September.

"Do We Have Enough Strategic Materials for War?"

By John Connor. Collier's. September 9.

''The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with
the Western System."

By Dr. W.W. Kulski. The American Journal of Inter
national Law. July.

"Our Last, Best Hope for Peace."

By Bernard M. Baruch. Look. September 26.

"The Riddle of the Russian Sea."

By James P. O'Donnell. The Saturday Evening Post.
�eptember 9.

"Stalin Takes a Breather."

By David J. Dallin. The New Leader. September 9.

"Korea--Tougher to Crack Than Okinawa."

By Captain Walter Karig, USNR. Collier's. September 23. ·

"The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia."

By Milton Sacks. Pacific Affairs. September.

"How Russia Built the North Korean Army."

By Kyril Kalinov. The Reporter. September 26.
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